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In this paper, we study a pure exchange economy with idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty, hidden action and multiple consumption goods.
We consider two di®erent market structures: contingent markets
on the one hand, and ¯nancial and spot markets on the other
hand. We propose a competitive equilibrium concept for each
market structure. We show that the equilibrium with contin-
gent markets is e±cient in an appropriate sense, while the equi-
librium with ¯nancial and spot markets is ine±cient, provided
that assumptions on preferences more general than those usually
considered in the literature hold.
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In this paper, we study a pure exchange economy with idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty, hidden action and multiple consumption goods. For this economy,
we consider two di®erent market structures. On the one hand, we assume
that there exists a complete set of markets for commodities with delivery
contingent on idiosyncratic states. On the other hand, we assume that there
exists a complete set of ¯nancial markets, together with spot markets for
consumption goods.
For each market structure considered, we propose a suitable equilibrium
concept and we study its e±ciency properties, in order to understand if dif-
ferences in market structure result in di®erences in e±ciency of equilibrium.
It is well know that when there is no hidden action, assuming complete con-
tingent markets or complete ¯nancial and spot markets is irrelevant as far
as e±ciency is concerned. This result follows because the two market struc-
tures allow to reach the same allocations of consumption goods, provided
that prices are related in an appropriate way.
When there is hidden action, the incentive compatibility constraint becomes
an essential element of the equilibrium. With multiple consumption goods,
that constraint depends on optimal bundles, which in turns depend on the
market structure. The latter therefore becomes relevant for the e±ciency of
competitive equilibria.
In this paper, we ¯rst show that any equilibrium with contingent markets is
e±cient in an appropriate sense. Subsequently, we show that the equilibrium
with ¯nancial and spot markets is ine±cient, provided that assumptions on
preferences more general than those usually considered in the literature hold.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the economy is described
and in section 3 the appropriate e±cient allocation is characterized. Sub-
sequently, in section 4 the competitive equilibrium with contingent markets
is introduced, and its e±ciency properties are studied in section 4.3. Sub-
sequently, in section 5 the competitive equilibrium with ¯nancial markets
is introduced, and its e±ciency properties are studied in sections 5.3-5.5.
Finally, in section 6 the relevant related literature is discussed.
2. The economy
Consider a pure exchange economy with L > 1 consumption goods. The
economy is populated by a large number of consumers all ex ante equal, and
lasts two periods t = 0;1.
1There is no consumption at t = 0, when consumers face an idiosyncratic
uncertainty which realizes in the second period. At t = 1, each consumer
may be in one out two states s 2 S = f1;2g.
Uncertainty a®ects only the amount of each good consumers are endowment
with at the beginning of the second period. Individual endowments are
denoted by w = (w1;w2) 2 R2L
+ .1 It is assumed that w1 À w2 , so that
state s = 1 will be referred to as the good state.2
Consumers can choose an action a 2 A = [0;1] a®ecting, on the one hand,
the probabilities of the idiosyncratic states, and, on the other hand, the
utility consumers get from consumption.
Preferences are represented by the following expected utility function v :
R2L
+ £ A ! R:
v(x1;x2;a) := ¼1(a)u(x1;a) + ¼2(a)u(x2;a);
where ¼s(a) : A ! (0;1) is a function giving the probability of state s when
action a is chosen.
According to the above general formulation, a is assumed to a®ect the utility
of every consumption good once the state is realized. This case will be
referred to as non-separable preferences.
A polar case arises when a does not a®ects the utility of any consumption
good once the state is realized. This case will be referred to as separable
preferences and it is formally stated in the following:
Assumption S. (Separable preferences) There exist utility indexes
~ u : RL
+ ! R and c : A ! R such that u(xs;a) := ~ u(xs) ¡ c(a):
Intermediate cases are also possible. In particular it may be the case that
a a®ects the utility of some, but not all consumption goods. A particularly
simple case is considered in the following:
Assumption H. (Hemi-Non-separable preferences) There exist utili-
ty indexes f : R+ ! R and g : RL¡1
+ £ A ! R such that u(xs;a) :=
f(xsj) + g(x
¡j




++ is a bundle consumption goods obtained by eliminating
good sj.
It is assumed that the action chosen by a consumer remains unknown to
anyone else in the economy, so that information is asymmetric. On the
other hand, it is assumed that endowments are veri¯able at t = 1, so that
it is possible to determine in which idiosyncratic state consumers are.
1R
L
+ denotes the positive orthant of dimension L.
2Given two vectors x;y 2 R
L
+, x À y means xl > yl for all l.
23. Constrained efficient allocation
Suppose there exists a benevolent planner perfectly informed on the fun-
damentals of the economy, in particular on preferences and endowments.
Suppose in addition that he is subject to the same limits on information as
any other economic agent, so that he cannot verify the level of action chosen
by consumers.
The role of the planner is to assign a feasible distribution of consumption
goods and to prescribe an action so as to maximize consumers' utility. Be-
cause of limits on information, the planner can only prescribe actions that
are optimal given the assigned consumption bundle. In the standard jar-
gon, this means that the planner can only choose among the set of incentive
compatible actions.
Implicit in this reasoning is the fact that the planner observes actual con-
sumption at t = 1, so that he can enforce a given distribution of consump-
tion bundles. It is therefore excluded that consumers re-trade after having
received their prescribed bundles. This in turn implies that the choice of a
is the only hidden action consumers make.
From the above discussion, it follows that the constrained e±cient allocation
(x1;x2;a) is the solution of the following:
max
x1;x2;a v(x1;x2;a)
s:t: ¼1(a)(x1 ¡ w1) + ¼2(a)(x2 ¡ w2) 6 0; (1a)
a = argmax v(x1;x2;a): (1b)
In the above problem, (1a) is the feasibility constraint, which holds in ex-
pected value thanks to assumption of large number of consumers, while (1b)
is the incentive compatibility constraint. It states that the only admissible
actions in the planner's choice set are those maximizing the consumers' util-
ity given the prescribed consumption bundle.
In what follows, B will denote the set of (x1;x2;a) satisfying (1a) and (1b).
The solution of the planner's problem will be the benchmark for evaluating
the e±ciency of the di®erent types of competitive equilibrium to be intro-
duced in the following sections.
4. The contingent market (CM) model
In this section, we suppose there exists a complete set of markets for com-
modities with delivery contingent on idiosyncratic states. Consumers trade
3in these markets, which are open at t = 0, by selling their state-contingent
endowments and buying a bundle of consumption goods to be delivered only
if the corresponding state is realized.
Once bundles have been chosen, markets close. Consumers then choose their
preferred action a. At t = 1, the uncertainty is resolved, and consumption
goods are eventually delivered according to purchases.
In order to de¯ne an equilibrium concept for this economy, we have to in-
troduce an appropriate price system. Given the complete set of contingent-
commodity markets, SL prices has to be quoted. Suppose for a moment
that there is no hidden action. In this case, we know from Malinvaud (1972)
that there exist restrictions on the price system such that a well de¯ned
equilibrium concept displaying satisfactory e±ciency properties can be de-
¯ned.
These restrictions essentially require the price of one unit of good l delivered
in state s to be properly related to the actual probability of that state. In
particular, suppose that pl is the price of one unit of good l with delivery
at t = 1 no matter what the state is. Following Malinvaud (1972), we may
call it the price for sure delivery of good l.
Given the price for sure delivery, and given that state s has probability ¼s,
we let the price at t = 0 of one unit of good l with delivery at t = 1 in state
s be equal to ¼spl .3
The introduction of hidden action does not alter the above reasoning in an
essential way. In this case ¼s depends on a. Hence we shall naturally assume
that the price of one unit of good l with delivery contingent on state s when
action a is chosen is equal to ¼s(a)pl .
To complete the reasoning it is only required to take into account the appro-
priate level of action. The only possible candidate is the incentive compatible
one, which satis¯es:
a = argmaxv(x1;x2;a):
From the above expression it is apparent that the incentive compatible level
of a is well de¯ned only once the the whole consumption bundle (x1;x2) is
considered. Therefore the price of one unit of good l in state s cannot be
quoted unless the consumption level of all the other goods is speci¯ed.
Moreover, the price one unit of good l in state s may well be di®erent
when consumed in conjunction with di®erent quantities of other consump-
tion goods. For this reason, the price system just constructed is sometime
referred to as non-linear.
3The price system described in the text is a simple generalization to the case of multiple
consumption good of the well known fair price system.
44.1. CM consumers' problem
From the above discussion, it follows that at t = 0 ¡ taking p 2 RL
++ as
given ¡ consumers choose (x1;x2;a) so as to solve the following:
max
x1;x2;a v(x1;x2;a)
s:t: ¼1(a)(p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2(a)(p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) 6 0; (2a)
a = argmax v(x1;x2;a): (2b)
In the above problem, (2a) is the budget constraint ¡ a single inequality
because of the market structure, while (2b) is the incentive compatibility
constraint.
In what follows, C(p) will denote the set of (x1;x2;a) that satisfy (2a)¡(2b).
4.2. CM Equilibrium
In a contingent market (CM) equilibrium, consumers optimize and markets
clear. These properties are collected in the following:
De¯nition 4.1. A CM equilibrium is (x;a;p) such that:
1. (x;a) = argmaxfv(x;a)j(x;a) 2 C(p)g ;
2. ¼1(a)(x1 ¡ w1) + ¼2(a)(x2 ¡ w2) = 0:
The market clearing condition in the above de¯nition is expressed in ex-
pected value because of the assumption of large number of consumers.
4.3. Efficiency of CM equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the e±ciency of CM equilibrium, where the former
is de¯ned as usual: an equilibrium allocation of consumption goods, and the
associated incentive compatible action, is constrained e±cient if there does
not exist another feasible allocation of consumption goods, and an associated
incentive compatible action, such that no consumer is worse o®, and at least
one consumer is better o®.
In the economy under analysis all consumers are ex ante equal. Hence the
last requirement implies that the utility of the (representative) consumer is
higher at the alternative allocation than at the equilibrium one.
Given this de¯nition of e±ciency, it is straightforward to verify the following:
5Proposition 1. Every CM equilibrium is constrained e±cient.
Proof. Take a CM equilibrium (x;a;p) and suppose that it is not constrained
e±cient. Then there exists (¹ x;¹ a) 2 B such that v(¹ x;¹ a) > v(x;a). Since
(¹ x;¹ a) 2 B implies ¹ a = argmaxv(¹ x;a), if the following inequality holds:
¼1(¹ a)(p ¢ (¹ x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2(¹ a)(p ¢ (¹ x2 ¡ w2)) 6 0;
then (¹ x;¹ a) 2 C(p) and (x;a) cannot be an equilibrium choice, for it is not
utility maximizing. It follows that:
¼1(¹ a)(p ¢ (¹ x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2(¹ a)(p ¢ (¹ x2 ¡ w2)) > 0;
which implies that:
p ¢ (¼1(¹ a)(¹ x1 ¡ w1) + ¼2(¹ a)(¹ x2 ¡ w2)) > 0;
hence (¹ x;¹ a) = 2 B, a contradiction that concludes the proof.
The above proposition extends to the case of hidden action the result of
e±ciency of competitive equilibrium for economies with a complete set of
contingent-commodity markets.
4.4. Characterization of CM equilibrium
In this section, we propose a characterization of the CM equilibrium through
¯rst order conditions that will be used later on in the paper.
As a ¯rst step, we replace the incentive compatibility constraint (2b) with
the corresponding ¯rst order condition:
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0:
The CM consumers' problem is then rewritten as follows:
max
x1;x2;a v(x1;x2;a)
s:t: ¼1(a)(p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2(a)(p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) 6 0: (3a)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0: (3b)
An interior solution of the above problem is characterized by the following
system of equations:4
4To save on notation, we write @ax1v for @x1@av, and ¼s for ¼s(a).
6@x1v ¡ ^ °¼1p ¡ ^ ¹@ax1v = 0; (4a)
@x2v ¡ ^ °¼2p ¡ ^ ¹@ax2v = 0; (4b)
^ °^ ¾ + ^ ¹@aav = 0; (4c)
¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) = 0; (4d)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0; (4e)
where ^ ° is the multiplier for constraint (3a), ^ ¹ is the multiplier for constraint
(3b) and:5
^ ¾ := @a¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + @a¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)):
Together with the market clearing conditions, (4a)¡(4e) characterize the
CM equilibrium.
We shall make explicit at this point the equilibrium restrictions on the gra-
dient of the (Bernoulli) utility index u, since they will be useful later on.
Using (3b), direct calculation gives:
@axsv = @a¼s@xsu + ¼s@axsu:
Substitute the above equation in (4a)¡(4b) and collect terms to get:
µ
¼s ¡ ^ ¹@a¼s
¼s
¶
@xsu = ^ °p + ^ ¹@axsu: (5)
We remark for future reference that any consumption bundle xs which is
part of a CM equilibrium must satisfy (5).
5. The financial market (FM) model
In this section, we consider a market structure di®erent from the previous
one. At t = 0, instead of trading on contingent markets, consumers trade
on ¯nancial market so as to transfer income from one state to the other.
The asset traded at t = 0 may be equivalently interpreted as an insurance
contract, or as a portfolio of S Arrow-securities, each paying one unit of
account if and only if state s happens.
5In deriving (4c) we have used (3b).
7In what follows, ¿ = (¿1;¿2) 2 R2 will denote the state-contingent payo®s of
the asset bought by consumers.
After having bought the asset, consumers choose their preferred action. Sub-
sequently, at t = 1, uncertainty resolves, and trading on spot markets takes
place. Consumers use income obtained from selling endowments and from
asset payo® to buy goods with immediate delivery.
To de¯ne a suitable equilibrium concept for the economy just described,
S +L prices must be considered, respectively for the ¯nancial asset and the
consumption goods.
Given the structure of trades, asset prices depend on the action chosen by
consumers, which in turn depends on the optimal consumption at t = 1.
The incentive compatibility constraint must then be adapted to consider the
e®ects of trading on the spot markets.
5.1. FM consumers' problem
From the above discussion, it follows that at t = 0 ¡ taking p 2 RL
++ as




s:t: ¼1(a)¿1 + ¼2(a)¿2 6 0; (6a)
p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1) 6 ¿1 ; (6b)
p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2) 6 ¿2 ; (6c)
a = argmax v(x1;x2;a); (6d)
x1 = argmaxfu(x1;a)jp ¢ (x1 ¡ w1) 6 ¿1g; (6e)
x2 = argmaxfu(x2;a)jp ¢ (x2 ¡ w2) 6 ¿2g: (6f)
In the above problem, (6a) is the budget constraint for the ¯nancial asset,
with prices actuarially fair given the action chosen, while (6b) and (6c) are
the budget constraints for the consumption goods. As for (6d)¡(6f), they
constitute the (extended) incentive compatibility constraint. They imply,
in particular, that any admissible level action must be optimal given the
optimal consumption at t = 1.
In what follows, D(p) will denote the set of (x;a;¿) that satisfy (6a)¡(6f).
85.2. FM equilibrium
In a FM equilibrium consumers optimize and markets clear. These proper-
ties are summarized in the following:
De¯nition 5.1. A FM equilibrium is (x;a;¿;p) such that:
1. (x;a;¿) = argmaxfv(x;a)j(x;a;¿) 2 D(p)g ;
2. ¼1(a)(x1 ¡ w1) + ¼2(a)(x2 ¡ w2) = 0:
We remark that the market clearing condition in above de¯nition is ex-
pressed in expected value because of the assumption of large number of
consumers.6
5.3. Efficiency of FM equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the e±ciency of FM equilibrium. E±ciency
is de¯ned as before: an equilibrium allocation of consumption goods, and
the associated level of action, is constrained e±cient if there does not exist
another feasible allocation of consumption good, and an associated incentive
compatible action, such that no consumer is worse o®, and at least one
consumer is better o®.
In the introduction, we claimed there exist cases in which the FM equilibrium
is constrained ine±cient. A quick observation of choice sets C(p) and D(p)
reveals where the problem lies.
Since (x;a;¿) 2 D(p) implies (x;a) 2 C(p), it seems possible to prove e±-
ciency of FM equilibrium as follows: take a CM equilibrium (^ x;^ a;p). Con-
struct transfers ^ ¿ := p ¢ (^ x ¡ e). Assume that (^ x;^ a; ^ ¿) 2 D(p), but that
(^ x;^ a; ^ ¿) is not a FM equilibrium. In this case, there exist (¹ x;¹ a; ¹ ¿) 2 D(p)
such that v(¹ x;¹ a) > v(^ x;^ a). As (¹ x;¹ a) 2 C(p), we get a contradiction with
(^ x;^ a) being a CM equilibrium. Hence we shall conclude that (^ x;^ a) must be
a FM equilibrium, which is then e±cient, since every CM equilibrium so is.
This reasoning holds provided that (^ x;^ a; ^ ¿) 2 D(p). The relevant question
is then whether a CM equilibrium, together with implied ¯nancial transfers,
satis¯es the choice set of the FM consumers' problem.
Inspection of the set D(p) reveals that it is possible that the required inclu-
sion is not satis¯ed. The crux of the problem lies in equations (6e) and (6f).
They require ^ x be optimal at t = 1 ¡ when trading on consumption goods
takes place ¡ given prices p, transfers ^ ¿ and the action ^ a chosen at t = 0.
6In the interpretation of ¿ as a portfolio of Arrow-securities, the market clearing con-
dition on the asset market is automatically satis¯ed at the optimum.
9If there is only one consumption good, these equations do not add any
relevant constraint on FM equilibrium, since there is no trading at t = 1. If
preferences are separable, the level of action does not a®ect the level of ex
post utility, hence even in this case we may suspect that these equation do
not impose any further constraint on FM equilibrium. In this two cases, we
therefore expect the above inclusion to be satis¯ed, and the conclusion on
the constrained e±ciency of FM equilibrium to be correct.
When preferences are not separable, consumers who are given enough income
to buy ^ x may still to choose a di®erent bundle. This happens when ^ x does
not satis¯es (6e)¡(6f), where a is taken as ¯xed. In this case, here exists ~ x
which costs not more that ^ x at prices p and gives higher utility in at least one
state s. Since ~ x would be feasible when action is ^ a, and since it gives higher
utility in a least one state, it would be a possible CM equilibrium candidate.
Yet there is no guarantee that (~ x;^ a) satis¯es the incentive compatibility
constraint, hence that it is an actual CM equilibrium candidate.
While these observations highlight the main intuition behind ine±ciency
of FM equilibrium, in order to verify it we have to compare the ¯rst or-
der conditions characterizing the former with those characterizing the CM
equilibrium.
5.4. Characterization of FM equilibrium
In this section, we derive the ¯rst order conditions characterizing the FM
equilibrium.
Instead of working directly with the consumers' problem above de¯ned, we
¯rst derive a reduced-form FM consumers' problem, which is closer to the
CM consumers' problem. The ¯rst order conditions for the former will then
be easily comparable with those for the latter.
Starting with the constraints relevant at t = 1, we notice that (6e) and (6f)
imply that an admissible xs satis¯es:
max
xs
u(xs;a) s:t: p ¢ (xs ¡ es) ¡ ¿s 6 0: (7)
Let xs(¿;a) denote the solution of the above problem.7 It is characterized
by the following equations:
7It is apparent from (7) that consumption in state s depends only on the transfer in
state s. To save on notation, we shall write xs(¿;a) instead of xs(¿s;a). Moreover, since
prices are always taken as given, we do not explicitly write them as an argument of the
demand function.
10@xsu ¡ ¸sp = 0; (8a)
p ¢ (xs ¡ es) ¡ ¿s = 0: (8b)
Substitute xs(¿;a) in the FM consumers' problem and rewrite it as follows:8
max
¿;a v(x1(¿;a);x2(¿;a);a)
s:t: ¼1(a)(p ¢ (x1(¿;a) ¡ w1)) + ¼2(a)(p ¢ (x2(¿;a) ¡ w2)) 6 0;
a = argmaxv(x1(¿;a);x2(¿;a);a): (9a)
Finally, replace (9a) with the corresponding ¯rst order condition:
@x1v ¢ @ax1 + @x2v ¢ @ax2 + @av = 0: (10)
Since (8a)¡(8b) imply that:
@xsv ¢ @axs = ¼s@xsu ¢ @axs = ¼s¸s(p ¢ @axs) = 0;
(10) reduces to:
@av(x1(¿;a);x2(¿;a);a) = 0; (11)
so that the reduced-form FM consumer's problem is given by the following:
max
¿;a v(x1(¿;a);x2(¿;a);a)
s:t: ¼1(a)(p ¢ (x1(¿;a) ¡ w1)) + ¼2(a)(p ¢ (x2(¿;a) ¡ w2)) 6 0;
@av(x1(¿;a);x2(¿;a);a) = 0:
Notice that the above problem has the same structure as the CM consumers'
one, the only di®erence being that admissible consumption bundles satisfy
(6e)¡(6f).
An interior solution of the above problem is characterized by the following
equations:9
8Here (8b) has been used to substitute for ¿s in (6a).
9In deriving (13a)¡(13b) we used (8a) and the fact that @¿2x1 = @¿1x2 = 0, while in
deriving (13c) we used the fact that p ¢ @axs = 0.
11¼1¸1 ¡ °¼1 ¡ ¹(@ax1v ¢ @¿1x1) = 0; (13a)
¼2¸2 ¡ °¼2 ¡ ¹(@ax2v ¢ @¿2x2) = 0; (13b)
°¾ + ¹@aav + ¹(@ax1v ¢ @ax1 + @ax2v ¢ @ax2) = 0; (13c)
¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) = 0; (13d)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0; (13e)
where ° is the multiplier for the ¯rst constraint, ¹ is the multiplier for the
second constraint and:
¾ := @a¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + @a¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)):
Multiply (13a)¡(13b) by p and use (8a) to get the following system of equa-
tions:
@x1v ¡ °¼1p ¡ ¹(@ax1v ¢ @¿1x1)p = 0; (14a)
@x2v ¡ °¼2p ¡ ¹(@ax2v ¢ @¿2x2)p = 0; (14b)
°¾ + ¹@aav + ¹(@ax1v ¢ @ax1 + @ax2v ¢ @ax2) = 0; (14c)
¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) = 0; (14d)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0: (14e)
Together with the market clearing conditions, (14a)¡(14e) characterize the
FM equilibrium.
To highlight the role of assumptions on preferences and number of consump-
tion goods, it is useful to rewrite the last addends in (14a)¡(14c) in terms
of the (Bernoulli) utility index u as follows:10
@x1v ¡ °¼1p ¡ ¹@ax1v + Ã1 = 0; (15a)
@x2v ¡ °¼2p ¡ ¹@ax2v + Ã2 = 0; (15b)
°¾ + ¹@aav + Ãa = 0; (15c)
10Calculations are in Appendix.
12where the Ã-terms are de¯ned as follows:
Ãs := ¹¼s (@axsu ¡ (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs)p) ; (16a)
Ãa := ¹(¼1 (@ax1u ¢ @ax1) + ¼2 (@ax2u ¢ @ax2)) : (16b)
We remark that (15a)¡(15b) are 2L equations, while (15c) is a single equa-
tion.
5.5. Comparing first order conditions
For ease of comparison, we recall here the equations characterizing a CM
equilibrium:
@x1v ¡ °¼1p ¡ ¹@ax1v = 0; (17a)
@x2v ¡ °¼2p ¡ ¹@ax2v = 0; (17b)
°¾ + ¹@aav = 0; (17c)
¼1 (p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) = 0; (17d)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0: (17e)
We want to study when the above equations coincide with those character-
izing a FM equilibrium:11
@x1v ¡ °¼1p ¡ ¹@ax1v + Ã1 = 0; (18a)
@x2v ¡ °¼2p ¡ ¹@ax2v + Ã2 = 0; (18b)
°¾ + ¹@aav + Ãa = 0; (18c)
¼1((p ¢ (x1 ¡ w1)) + ¼2 (p ¢ (x2 ¡ w2)) = 0; (18d)
@a v(x1;x2;a) = 0: (18e)
In both systems, the last two equations are the same, hence they do not
pose any problem. As for (18a)¡(18c) and (17a)¡(17c), they di®er for the
11For simplicity we neglect market clearing conditions, as they are the same in both
systems.
13Ã-terms. It is therefore necessary to study when Ãs = 0 and Ãa = 0. From
(16a) and (16b), we know this happens if and only if the following system
of 2L + 1 equations is satis¯ed:
@ax1u ¡ (@ax1u ¢ @¿1x1)p = 0; (19a)
@ax2u ¡ (@ax2u ¢ @¿2x2)p = 0; (19b)
¼1 (@ax1u ¢ @ax1) + ¼2 (@ax2u ¢ @ax2) = 0: (19c)
When there is a single consumption good and when preferences are separa-
ble, the above equations are identities.
Indeed, if there is a single consumption good, p is normalized to one, @¿sxs ´
1 and @axs ´ 0, so that the above system is identically satis¯ed.12
If preferences are separable, then @axsu ´ 0, so that the above system is
again identically satis¯ed.
In these two cases, the system of equations characterizing the CM and the
FM equilibrium are therefore identical. Hence, the equilibrium allocation of
goods and action level must be the same. Given that every CM equilibrium
is constrained e±cient, so is every FM equilibrium.
The following proposition collects these ¯ndings:
Proposition 2. Suppose there is single consumption good or assumption S
holds. Then every FM equilibrium is constrained e±cient.
We now consider the possibility that (19a)¡(19c) are not satis¯ed, so that
the FM equilibrium is not constrained e±cient.
If we let ³s := (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs), we notice that (19a)¡(19b) imply that:
@ax1u = ³1p; (20a)
@ax2u = ³2p: (20b)
According to (20a)¡(20b), for the system (19a)¡(19c) to be satis¯ed it
is necessary that @axsu and p are collinear, with scale factor ³s 6= 0. If
this condition is violated, the system cannot be satis¯ed. The following
proposition formalize this intuition:
12Notice that in this case @axsv is a scalar.
14Proposition 3. Suppose there are multiple consumption goods and prefer-
ences are non-separable. Provided that @axsu 6= ³sp for ³s 6= 0, the FM
equilibrium is not constrained e±cient.
As a ¯nal step, we verify that the condition in the above proposition is not
empty:
Proposition 4. Suppose there are multiple consumption goods and prefer-
ences satisfy assumption H. Then the FM equilibrium is not constrained
e±cient.
Proof. The proof consists in verifying that @axsu 6= ³sp for ³s 6= 0. When
assumption H holds, it follows that:
@axsju ´ 0; and @axsiu = @axsig(x¡j
s ;a) for i 6= j :
It follows that @axsu = ³sp for ³s 6= 0 implies:
0 = ³1pj ; (21a)
@ax1ig(x
¡j
1 ;a) = ³1pi for i 6= j ; (21b)
0 = ³2pj ; (21c)
@ax2ig(x
¡j
2 ;a) = ³2pi for i 6= j : (21d)
Since the above system is inconsistent, we conclude that @axsu 6= ³sp.
A further intuition of the above result is obtained by comparing the restric-
tions on @xsu ¡ the gradient of the (Bernoulli) utility index u ¡ both in FM
and CM equilibrium. According to (8a), in a FM equilibrium the consump-
tion allocation must be such that @xsu and p are collinear. According (5),
this restriction is satis¯ed in a CM equilibrium provided that assumption S
holds, or that preferences are non-separable and @axsu = ³sp for ³s 6= 0.
6. Related literature
The idea of the CM equilibrium dates back to the seminal paper of Prescott
and Townsend (1984). Formally, their model is rather di®erent from ours.
To avoid non-convexities both in the utility functions ¡ due to a discrete
action set ¡ and in the budget constraints, lotteries on consumption goods
are introduced, and consumers are allowed to choose among them. While
the objects of trades are di®erent, the market structure and the nature of
15the price system are analogous to those considered here. As a result, an
appropriate version of proposition 1 holds for their model too.
Closely related to the model of Prescott and Townsend (1984) is that of
Kocherlakota (1998). The main formal di®erences are the absence of lot-
teries, since non-convexities are eliminated by appropriate assumption on
the utility function and on the action set, and the hypothesis of a single
consumption good.
Rustichini and Siconol¯ (2003) have recently revised the model of Prescott
and Townsend, generalizing the conditions for existence and optimality of
equilibrium.
In the above models, the only hidden action consumers make is choosing
a, since their consumption choices can be monitored, hence enforced. The
relevance of this assumption for the e±ciency of competitive equilibrium has
been stressed in a series of papers by Arnott and Stiglitz (1986), Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott et al. (1992). These authors claim that
ine±cient equilibria emerge if that assumption is removed. The claim is
proved using a model of optimal taxation, where a benevolent planner is
supposed to redistribute income through insurance contracts assigned at
t = 0, and tax or subsidize trades on spot markets. In this set-up, ine±ciency
of equilibrium corresponds to non-zero taxes. Indeed, Arnott and Stiglitz
(1983) ¯nd that this case arises if there are multiple consumption goods and
preferences satisfy assumption H.
Yet, di®erences in the model set-up in part obscured the connection between
the two strands of literature. As a matter of fact, the explicit comparison of
the CM with the FM equilibrium is an attempt to clarify that connection,
and in particular the importance of di®erences in the trade structure.
Under simpler assumptions, the FM equilibrium has been studied by Help-
man and La®ont (1975), who obtained an e±ciency result analogous to
proposition 2 for the case of a single consumption good, and by Lisboa
(2001), who obtained an e±ciency result analogous to proposition 2 for the
case of separable preferences.
Appendix
In this Appendix we derive equations (15a)¡(15c). Recall that:
@axsv = @a¼s@xsu + ¼s@axsu:
Since p ¢ @¿sxs = 1, we get the following chain of equalities:
16(@axsv ¢ @¿sxs)p = ((@a¼s@xsu + ¼s@axsu) ¢ @¿sxs)p
= (@a¼s (@xsu ¢ @¿sxs) + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs))p
= (@a¼s¸s (p ¢ @¿sxs) + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs))p
= @a¼s¸sp + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs)p
= @a¼s@xsu + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs)p
= @axsv ¡ ¼s@axsu + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs)p
= @axsv ¡ ¼s (@axsu ¡ (@axsu ¢ @¿sxs)p) : (22)
Since p ¢ @axs = 0, we also get the following chain of equalities:
(@axsv ¢ @axs) = (@a¼s@xsu + ¼s@axsu) ¢ @axs
= @a¼s (@xsu ¢ @axs) + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @axs)
= @a¼s¸s (p ¢ @axs) + ¼s (@axsu ¢ @axs)
= ¼s (@axsu ¢ @axs) : (23)
Substituting (22) and (23) in (14a)¡(14c) we get the equations in the text.
References
Arnott, R., B. Greenwald, and J. Stiglitz (1992). Information and economic
e±ciency. NBER Working Paper 4533.
Arnott, R. and J. Stiglitz (1983). Moral hazard and optimal commodity
taxation. NBER Working Paper 1154.
Arnott, R. and J. Stiglitz (1986). Moral hazard and optimal commodity
taxation. Journal of Public Economics 29, 434{462.
Greenwald, B. and J. Stiglitz (1986). Externalities in economies with im-
perfect information and incomplete markets. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 101, 229{264.
Helpman, H. and J. La®ont (1975). On moral hazard in general equilibrium
theory. Journal of Economic Theory 10, 8{23.
17Kocherlakota, N. (1998). The e®ects of moral hazard on asset prices when
¯nancial markets are complete. Journal of Monetary Economics 41, 39{
56.
Lisboa, M. (2001). Moral hazard and general equilibrium in large economies.
Economic Theory 18, 555{575.
Malinvaud, E. (1972). The allocation of individual risk in large markets.
Journal of Economic Theory 4, 312{328.
Prescott, E. and R. Townsend (1984). Pareto optima and competitive equi-
libria with adverse selection and moral hazard. Econometrica 66, 880{890.
Rustichini, A. and P. Siconol¯ (2003). Economies with asymmetric infor-
mation and individual risk. Mimeo.
18Département des Sciences Économiques
de l'Université catholique de Louvain
Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales
Place Montesquieu, 3
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique
 ISSN 1379-244X         D/2006/3082/049